‘Authority’ is a term that is widely used and considered to be of the utmost importance. At the same time, however, it is highly controversial and deeply indeterminate. Moreover, there are several questions related to ‘authority’ that are not always differentiated or clearly addressed within discourses on authority.
Let us here briefly consider these problems of ‘authority’.
Controversy and indeterminacy about ‘authority’
At first glance, in my view, there are four major sources of problems or difficulties when attempting to address the issue: (1) indeterminacy; (2) multiplicity of levels of discourse; (3) lack of clarity about scope or limits of discourses; and (4) existence of multiple discourses considered in “competition” with each other.
Indeterminacy
In ordinary language, ‘authority’ appears in a multiplicity of statements that do not seem to be uttered in the same contexts or with the same denotation: statements such as “X has authority over Y”; ‘X has the authority to perform act Z’; “X’s authority is unquestionable”; “X is an authority (on A)”, and “X is the ultimate authority in the system”.
This circumstance becomes even more difficult when considering linguistic multiplicity, where the term “authority” in different languages (autoridad, autorité, autorità, autoridade, Autorität…) may or may not suffer from indeterminacy or, if it does, it may not be the same as in other languages. The vagueness and open texture of language also play their part.
Multiplicity of levels of discourse
Another difficulty is the multiplicity of levels, functions, or uses of language 3 in the statements in which the term “authority” is used. The examples of statements in the previous paragraph seem, at first glance, to be merely descriptive. However, a statement such as “X has the authority to perform act Z” can be descriptive or prescriptive, depending on the context. It may express that, in fact, “X has the authority to perform act Z” (referring to a certain state of affairs in the world), or it may be a prescriptive act whose content is a norm such that “X has the authority to perform act Z”, in the sense that X has the right or competence to do Z.
A similar ambivalence can arise from statements that at first glance appear to be merely prescriptive, such as ‘Y must obey the orders of authority X’: as in the previous case, it can be both a prescriptive and a descriptive statement (about, for example, the existence of a prescriptive act whose content is a norm). Other statements seem unquestionably prescriptive, such as ‘X should be considered an authority,’ etc. Unfortunately, it is not always clear at what level, function, or use of language the statements under analysis have been issued.
Lack of clarity about scope or limits of discourses
A third difficulty, partly related to the previous one, is the lack of clarity in discourses on authority regarding its scope or limits. In my opinion, this has to do with at least two issues. The first is a failure to identify the existence (or clear separation) of two basic levels of analysis of authority: on the one hand, identification and, on the other, acceptance or attribution. The second is a lack of clarity in defining the specific scope (theoretical, academic, practical) of the discourse. The latter may have the over-inclusive effect of considering discourses as extendable to all areas of knowledge (and asserting, for example, that the same concept of authority works in all contexts); and/or, conversely, it may have the under-inclusive effect of not extending them to areas to which they might also correspond.
Multiplicity of discourses and “competition”
Finally, a fourth difficulty is the existence of multiple discourses on authority that are considered to be in ‘competition’ with each other. Here, the main problem lies in the lack of clarity as to whether the competition is over the concept of authority itself or whether, sharing the same concept, it is a competition between different (at least partially incompatible) conceptions.
A further problem lies in the difficulty of establishing whether these are indeed comprehensive, mutually exclusive discourses in competition, or whether they are in fact non-comprehensive and partially compatible discourses, or comprehensive and compatible discourses, given that they are simply complementary analyses from different points of view or areas of knowledge.
The questions about ‘authority’
When researching authority, there are at least two types of questions: questions about the nature of authority and questions about what authority should be. Thus, questions could be considered about the ontology of authority (‘What is authority?’) and about the deontology of authority (‘What/How should authority be?’). If we consider that all ontological questions can be analysed more effectively in conceptual terms, we could say that there are two main lines of research: conceptual questions and normative questions.
Conceptual questions
Conceptual questions revolve around issues such as the following, among many others:
- What are the elements of the concept of authority?
- Are these elements necessary, sufficient, or both necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of the term?
- What kind of elements are they?
- What kind of concept is it, or what kind of concept can it be?
- What is the semantic referent, or that which would be denoted, by the term?
- What are the conditions of truth (if any) of the statements that use the term?
Normative questions
Normative questions revolve around questions such as the following, among many others:
- What should be done in the face of authority?
- Can there be such a thing as legitimate authority? What conditions must an authority fulfil in order to be legitimate?
- Is there a duty to obey authority?
- What, if anything, would be the content and scope of that duty?
- Under what conditions should authority be accepted or obeyed?
- Can it ever be morally justified to act on the basis of an order? Is authority compatible with autonomy?
A meta-question
The conceptual and normative questions that can be conceived are perhaps innumerable, so the preceding paragraphs should be understood as merely illustrative. An interesting point, however, is a further question (or meta-question): is there any relationship between conceptual and normative types of questions? If so, what kind of relationship would this be?
In this regard, I understand that there are two main positions. The first is that the questions can be considered completely separately: there would be no necessary conceptual or other relationship between them. The second is that the questions cannot be considered separately, as there is a necessary relationship between them given that the second takes priority over the first. In other words, this second position maintains that concepts cannot be analysed without introducing considerations about their justification.
To read more about this, check out the full book: Rabanos, J.A, Modelos contemporáneos de autoridad. Elementos para un análisis de la autoridad desde la filosofía del derecho. Madrid: Marcial Pons (2025) [LINK]
My work on this supported by Grant RYC2023-043168-I funded by MICIU/AEI /10.13039/501100011033 and by the FSE+
SUGGESTED CITATION: Rabanos, Julieta A., “Some Problems of ‘Authority’”, FOLBlog, 2025/10/31, https://fol.ius.bg.ac.rs/2025/10/31/some-problems-of-authority/